This appendix sets up a discrete version of the model where both WTP for quality and WTP for status utility are independently distributed. This model is brie ‡y discussed towards the end of section 6 (footnote 18) in body of the paper.
The producer optimally responds to the above preferences with price-skimming sequence
A full characterization of the producer's pricing solution proved intractable. We instead chose four values of cost parameter k which allow, but do not necessarily guarantee, sales to occur in both periods. Pricing sequences are listed below for each sampled value of k.
Proposition 1 does not hold over the entire domain, as g. Notably, the producer sells to f 3 ; w 3 g = f1; wg and f 4 ; w 4 g = f1; wg in t = 1 under both price schemes. In the …nal period, the …rm sells to f 2 ; w 2 g = f0; wg when
g and both f 1 ; w 1 g = f0; wg and f 2 ; w 2 g = f0; wg for fP
g. While neither i = 1; 2 place a premium on quality, f 2 ; w 2 g greatly cares about social status; here, the second period cohort values status at least as much, if not more than, the early buyer cohort. This drives the result that @ @ P 2 (P 1 ) P 1 > 0, although it is not clear whether this occurs in equilibrium when both i and w i are continuously distributed.
